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Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Strategy and
Law
HARRY H. ALMOND, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The primary issue that Professor Fried raises in his critical essay in
the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy is:
Whether international law - particularly the law of war (jus in bello) -
makes the use of nuclear weapons against other states impermissible.'
Professor Fried asserts that international law establishes the illegal-
ity of nuclear weapons as illegal per se; that is, that nuclear weapons are
impermissible regardless of use. It follows that the first use of nuclear
weapons is unlawful and Professor Fried supports the no-first-use pledge.
Fried opposes the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), because he believes
that it will not provide a comprehensive defense system and is incompati-
ble with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Fried recognizes that
states may invoke nuclear weapons by way of reprisals, but he observes:
[I]t is questionable whether nuclear reprisal could achieve the very
purpose of reprisal, namely, to induce the opponent to discontinue its
illegal behavior.2
Professor Fried believes that the no-first-use pledge can have "legally
binding character," because this is what the International Court of Jus-
tice declared in 1974. 3 "Governments," according to Fried, "can make for-
mal declarations" and these can be made "unilaterally at any time."
4
And, "if governments wish," they can become "binding at once."5 While
Fried recognizes that the Soviet and Chinese versions of the no-first-use
pledge, "neither promises nor expects any renunciation of the right to
nuclear reprisals (second use)," the pledge is not "useless."" Presumably,
* B.S. Yale; J.D. Harvard Law School; LL.M. and Ph.D. with highest distinction in
international law, London School of Economics; member, New York Bar; Bar of the United
States Supreme Court; Barrister-at-law, of Gray's Inn, London. No attribution of the com-
ments and opinions set forth in this paper should be made to the National Defense Univer-
sity, the United States Government, nor to Georgetown University where the author is a
professor in the National Security Studies Program of the Graduate School.
1. Fried, The Nuclear Collision Course: Can International Law Be Of Help?, 14 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 97 (1985).
2. Id. at 113.
3. Id. at 114.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 115. For an article that illustrates the sharp difference between democratic
states and the Soviet Union, see TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, (W.E. Poufler
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it would provide what amounts to a mind-set among decision makers: a
psychological barrier to the future use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the
act of pledging would wind down the "systematic preparations for instan-
taneous nuclear response."7
A number of propositions subordinate to the primary issue of the le-
gality of nuclear weapons appear in Professor Fried's commentary. They
form the basis for this brief response. However, I must say at the outset
that I share with Fried an abhorrence of nuclear weapons and of war con-
ducted with weapons of any kind. The experience among states that we
both invoke, however, discloses new conventional weapons that have the
destructive force equivalent to nuclear weapons, and include chemical
and biological weapons that would augment the destructiveness of war-
fare in general. Our differences lie in a perception of the measures that
might realistically be taken by the United States and the Soviet Union,
coupled with participation by other states, that would make nuclear war
less likely.
I respond to Fried's essay by making the following argument. First,
an analysis of international law and specifically, the law of war, shows
that nuclear weapons are not, as Fried contends, illegal per se. The law of
war addresses itself to the use of weapons during war, rarely prohibiting,
under all conditions, the use of specific types of weapons. In some situa-
tions, the use of nuclear weapons may cause less destruction and suffering
than some conventional weapons, and therefore better conforms to the
spirit of the law of war. Second, deterrence has always been a fundamen-
tal aspect of nuclear arms control, but works only when the threat of ag-
gression is backed by stocked and ready arsenals. Finally, the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) need not be the comprehensive defense system
Fried portrays; it is, rather, a defensive system aimed at enhancing deter-
rence policy and as such, it is not only legal, but a necessary element in
shaping our policy with the Soviet Union. I will discuss some of the rele-
vant propositions raised by Fried.
I. LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
First, contrary to Fried's opinion, nuclear weapons are not illegal per
se under international law, nor in particular, under the law of war. This
proposition raises three related points to be examined together: whether
nuclear weapons are treated as illegal under all circumstances in wartime
use; when such weapons are treated as illegal because they violate the law
of war; and whether such weapons are unlawful if first used for the pur-
poses of self-defense in response to aggression.
The law of war, emanating from the practice of states and from the
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bat, has prohibited only a few weapons as illegal per se. Moreover, these
prohibitions are not all based upon the application of law, because some,
such as those applied to dum-dum bullets, were finally adopted as a re-
sult of political pressures. The wounds created by dum-dum bullets may
be more extensive than those created by other devices such as shrapnel,
or modern field rifles.
The application of the prohibitions of the law of war to weapons ap-
pears in three separate categories. The first consists of weapons or agents
which are subject to absolute or positive prohibitions under the usages
and practices of states. These include poisons and poisoned weapons, pro-
hibited by Article 23(a) of the Hague Regulations.' According to the De-
partment of Army's Field Manual, other examples are found in certain
usages:
Usage has, however, established the illegality of the use of lances with
barbed heads, irregular-shaped bullets, and projectiles filled with
glass, the use of any substance on the bullets that would tend unnec-
essarily to inflame a wound inflicted by them, and the scoring of the
surface or the filing off of the ends of the hard cases of bullets.9
However, with respect to poisons and poisonous weapons, the Man-
ual notes that Article 23(a):
[D]oes not prohibit measures being taken to dry up springs, to divert
rivers and aqueducts from their courses, or to destroy, through chemi-
cal or bacterial agents harmless to man, crops intended solely for con-
sumption by the armed forces (if that fact can be determined)."0
Clearly, the belligerents are free to impose upon themselves re-
straints or conditions which are more restrictive than those to be found in
the law of war. This, in fact, the United States did under its rules of
engagement as to the war in Vietnam. But decisions to impose those ad-
ditional restrictions are made by the belligerents among themselves and
do not arise from the restraints in the law of war that are shared with
other belligerents.
The second category of prohibitions is set out in Article 23(e) of the
Hague Regulations:
In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is
especially forbidden: (e) to employ arms, projectiles, or material calcu-
lated to cause unnecessary suffering.'
Under this article the belligerents are prohibited from the use of
weapons unless they justify such use through the necessities of warfare:
8. The Hague Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, art. 18 (annex), 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
9. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, FM27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, at 18 (1956) f hereinafter
cited as U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL].
10. Id.
11. Supra note 8.
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that is, the necessary suffering, legally established, that must be endured
during warfare or in combat conditions. In this connection, the Declara-
tion of St. Petersburg of 1868 12 is at times invoked. Its preamble declares
that the legitimate object of war would "be exceeded by the employment
of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or
render their death inevitable" and "that the employment of such arms
would therefore be contrary to the law of humanity." 3
These prohibitions must be read against the context of modern war-
fare, where the "law of humanity" does not prohibit all weapons that kill,
because all weapons, under at least some circumstances, foreseeably cause
death. A United States Air Force Pamphlet observes:
All weapons cause suffering. The critical factor in the prohibition
against unnecessary suffering is whether the suffering is needless or
disproportionate to the military advantages secured by the weapon,
not the degree of suffering itself. 4
This turns us back to the legal principle of military necessity as the
justification upon which the suffering is based. 5 There is, of course, the
additional element of humanity, noted by the Pamphlet:
The rule against unnecessary suffering applies also to the manner of
use of a weapon or method of warfare against combatants or enemy
military objectives. In this context, the prohibition precludes the in-
fliction of suffering upon individuals for its own sake or mere indul-
gence in cruelty.16
Professor Fried suggests that nuclear weapons are prohibited under
this proposition because they violate the rule against unnecessary suffer-
ing, but his analysis seemingly draws upon the physiological element of
suffering. He fails to recognize that the legal principle of military neces-
sity and the general principles in the law of war apply to all weapons.
War itself is justified by necessity, while the law of war simply regulates
the conduct of hostilities to prohibit conduct which is excessive, inhu-
mane, or deliberately, but unnecessarily, invoked.
17
The third category is based upon the proposition that the legal prin-
ciple of military necessity is subject to standards of reasonableness.
Under such standards, the use of force must be both necessary and
12. The Declaration of St. Petersburg, cited in FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR, 192-193
(1972). See also M. McDoUc.AL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER,
660 (1961).
13. Id.
14. DEPT. OF THE AIR FORCE, AFP 110-31, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONDUCT OF ARMED
CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 6-2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE].
15. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 72
(1961) offering a comprehensive approach to the matter of military necessity [hereinafter
cited as LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER].
16. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 14.
17. See II TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, Oct. 1946 - Apr. 1949, at 1253, 1254.
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designed to attain military objectives. These objectives must be limited to
legitimate military targets and the amount of force used against these
targets must be proportionate to the military objectives sought.
The legality of attacks during wartime is not restricted to those that
might cause damage exclusively to legitimate military objectives, because
this would be impossible under real world conditions. Some civilian casu-
alties must be anticipated or indirect damage incurred. Article 51 of the
Protocol I provides in paragraph 5(b) that attacks would be considered as
"indiscriminate" if they constitute an "attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." Thus a standard
of "reasonableness"-reasonableness in the context of licensed violence
during wartime-is imposed.
Professors McDougal and Feliciano have formulated the application
of this principle under this concept in terms of widely shared expecta-
tions that even violence unleashed during wartime will not lead to the
unnecessary destruction of values:
[T]he fundamental policy of minimum unnecessary destruction may
be seen to underlie questions of legitimacy ... [W]here the suffering
or deprivation of values incidental to the use of a particular weapon is
not excessively disproportionate to the military advantage accruing to
the belligerent user, the violence and the weapon by which it is ef-
fected may be regarded as permissible. All war instruments are
"cruel" and "inhuman" in the sense that they cause destruction and
human suffering. It is not, however, the simple fact of destruction, nor
even the amount thereof, that is relevant in the appraisal of such in-
struments; it is rather the needlessness, the superfluity of harm, the
gross imbalance between the military result, and the incidental injury
that is commonly regarded as decisive of illegitimacy. 8
The military commander, no less than the layman, is sensitive to the
principles of economy in the use of scarce resources, and seeks, through
the invocation of military measures, to achieve the objective prize without
unnecessary destruction. These are the perspectives that have led to the
policy base for the law of war and unquestionably, will be the perspec-
tives that will apply to the use of nuclear weapons.19 There are no mili-
tary advantages to be gained through the retaliatory destruction of ur-
banized areas through use of nuclear weapons."
The Department of Army Manual observes that "atomic weapons"
are not "regarded as violative of international law," and notes that such
law does not point to any "customary rule of international law or interna-
18. LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 15, at 72.
19. See McDOUUAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960).
20. See, e.g., DEPT OF THE ARMY PUBLICATION, FM 100-1 (1981).
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tional convention that specifically restricts their employment."'" The Air
Force Pamphlet in its discussion of "indiscriminate weapons," in particu-
lar the weapons or methods of warfare which may cause "excessive injury
or damage to civilians or civilian objectives," declares:
The extent to which a weapon discriminates between military objec-
tives and protected persons and objects depends usually on the man-
ner in which the weapon is employed rather than on the design quali-
ties of the weapon itself. Where a weapon is designed so that it can be
used against military objectives, its employment in a different man-
ner, such as against the civilian population, does not make the weapon
itself unlawful. Indiscriminate weapons are those incapable of being
controlled, through design or function, and thus they cannot, with any
degree of certainty, be directed at military objectives.22
While there is a grave risk that the use of tactical nuclear weapons,
or the impacts of massive force imposed by conventional weapons, or even
military doctrine, might lead to a large scale use of nuclear weapons of
greater destructive force, none of these facts alone enables us to condemn
such weapons under the existing law. Misuse of nuclear weapons, such as
uses contrary to the legal principle of military necessity, are violations of
the law of war, as is the use of other weapons under these conditions. The
use of nuclear weapons among naval forces in combat on the high seas is
likely to be a use which falls well within the permissibility of interna-
tional law and the law of war.
The juridical feature of the principle of military necessity operating
pursuant to law, is to encompass the process of claims and counterclaims
among states. If the principle is invoked, for example, in an international
tribunal, past practice indicates that there will be claims of justification
and opposing claims of illegality in numerous situations. This character-
ized the proceedings at Nuremburg. Because a legal principle of interna-
tional law embraces the overall claims process, the application of the
principle enables a tribunal to formulate more specific directives, drawing
upon the claims introduced, and the context in which the weapons or at-
tacks were launched or took place.23
Professor Fried is concerned with promoting the no-first-use pledge,
and seemingly raises his analysis relating to no-first-use in this connec-
tion. If his assumptions of illegality of nuclear weapons are accepted, then
it simply follows that the first use of such weapons, either by way of ag-
gression or during hostilities under way, would be illegal.
II. AGREEMENTS, IMPLEMENTATION AND PRACTICALITY
OF THE No-FIRST-USE PLEDGE
The no-first-use pledge, applicable during hostilities, might be ex-
21. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 9, at 18.
22. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 14, at 6-3.
23. LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 15, at 56.
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amined against the experience of the United States with the allegations
made by the Soviet Union and China that it had used bacteriological
agents in the Korean War. The United States at that time had not rati-
fied the Geneva Protocol of 1925,24 but it had recognized that the use of
chemical and biological agents were violations of customary international
law and that customary international law could be construed as applying
to any use of such agents. If it were construed this liberally, it would
impose restraints more substantial than those imposed by the Geneva
Protocol, because most of the states that ratified the Protocol, added a
reservation that they had the right to respond to any first use made
against them. Moreover, the Protocol itself limited its restraints to other
contracting parties. And some states, such as the Soviet Union, reserved
the right to respond to a first use against their allies as well as against
themselves.
In a real sense, the Protocol established the applicable law, which
tended to limit the content and reach of customary international law.
While it is arguable that the customary international law, with its wider
reach to all uses and subject to no reservations, was the law jus cogens,
and therefore was expected to override more restrictive law adopted by
way of treaties, such as the Protocol, the practice - the declarations and
behavior of states - indicates that they intend to adhere to the Protocol
and have thrown the customary international law restraints in doubt.
Our experience with the no-first-use pledge of the Geneva Protocol of
1925 leads to further consideration. The allegations of first-use by the
United States in the Korean War by the communist states were unques-
tionably fraudulent. This experience suggests that in future wars the no-
first-use pledge, combined with fraudulent allegations can lead to a justi-
fication to what will amount to a first-use by those making the allega-
tions. Because the Protocol as a treaty is expected to establish the rules
of restraint, this action would be tantamount to breaching the Protocol
and making it no longer applicable during the remainder of the conflict.
Clearly, if customary international law applies or continued to apply in
the example given, the right would be incorporated into a right of reprisal
and then limited to correcting the incident, but not extending to elimina-
tion of the application of the law to the remainder of the hostilities.
But states must look to their security. It is apparent that whether
they are prepared to retaliate by way of reprisal or through the freedom
to retaliate during hostilities by terminating the Protocol, they must have
the weapons stockpiled, tested, reliable and ready. They may need to
have their military forces and civilian population prepared to be immu-
nized against the use of such weapons. The entire no-first-use posture
during hostilities is fraught with uncertainty and for this reason the
United States, by way of general policy, has sought more than no-first-use
24. Geneva Protocol, June 17, 1925 - Apr. 29, 1975; see ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMA-
MENT AGREEMENTS (1982).
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pledges and has looked to a more effective disarmament agreement.
The experience with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 points to another
lesson in current practice among states. The Protocol does not serve arms
control objectives as such, it provides instead for controls over use of
weapons, such as those covered in the Protocol, during wartime. It does
not even apply to peacetime, or to the use of the agents it covers if in-
voked for other activities than "warfare". It operates under the law of
war, and its effectiveness is the effectiveness afforded by that law. The
reservations taken by states seem to recognize this. While those are reser-
vations to respond to a first use, in the wartime setting of violations of
customary international law, rather than under treaty law as found in the
Protocol, the response would be identified as a reprisal. However, the re-
prisal is conditional or limited under international law. It must be termi-
nated once the corrective action sought in its use has been accomplished.
States'reserving their right of response under treaties, are in a position to
claim that the breach of the treaty terminates the application of that
treaty with regard to the hostilities with the belligerent involved. Hence,
the Protocol provides at best, a limited barrier and once broken, provides
none at all, unless of course we shift to the application of customary in-
ternational law, emerging upon the breach of the Protocol to cover the
same activities.
Clearly, the Protocol, with its reservations and customary interna-
tional law, and with its, rights of reprisal, afford a deterrent to using
chemical or bacteriological agents. However, it is noteworthy that even
the deterrent element during World War II that made President
Roosevelt's warning to Germany effective, regarding any use that Ger-
many might make of chemical weapons against the United States or its
allies, lay in German perceptions that that element was enforceable. The
Germans believed that the United States would retaliate in attacks with
chemical weapons and more importantly, that the United States had the
lethality and destructive force in those weapons and the delivery capabil-
ity which would make the retaliation even more formidable than the ini-
tial attack.
We are justified, then, in distinguishing between the controls in arms
control measures and capabilities and the control measures to be found in
the law of war. This distinction turns on how the use of weapons is to be
controlled. The law of war imposes its controls upon the use of weapons
during wartime and those controls reflect expectations shared among bel-
ligerents with regard to both weapons and methods of attack occurring
during wartime. These controls are largely identified with responses in
kind or other responses to enforce a legal claim. Arms control agreements
do not usually provide for controls over the use of the weapons covered in
the agreements. Even when such controls are added to the agreements, it
is essential that they be incorporated in the understandings and decisions
of the parties to the applicable agreements to be applied with the law of
war, should they go to war. The control features of arms control govern
the weapons per se: how they are produced; tested and deployed; stock-
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piled; the number of them in inventories; and the number produced.
Furthermore, the no-first-use pledge of Professor Fried and others
would have strategic consequences which affect the freedom and capacity
of decision-makers to invoke defensive measures in a variety of situa-
tions.2" An aggressor could for example, launch a massive conventional
attack, under conditions where a response by conventional means would
be ineffectual. But the commander may find, in that aggression, that he
could respond effectively with nuclear weapons. Should that option be
foreclosed? Moreover, should its deterrent value also be foreclosed, as
would occur with the pledge? The pledge would foreclose him from all
uses of nuclear weapons for all purposes. He could not use them for tacti-
cal response, or tactical use. He would be unable to invoke the highly
discriminating nuclear weapons already in the arsenals of both the United
States and the Soviet Union. His planning, doctrine and strategy would
be materially changed and he would be unable to justify the weapons,
provide for their readied and tested use and their reliability.
Democratic states such as the United States must be exceedingly
careful to "keep their powder dry" when faced with the mounting threats
from the totalitarian communist states, because the ripple effect of secur-
ity decisions extends deeply into the democratic processes and to the op-
position engendered in terms of the allocation of resources and power.
Confusion and ambiguity in these processes can be readily exploited with
regard to security issues when they can only be superficially assessed by
the citizen.
The no-first-use pledge has separate implications for the arms con-
trol process. According to Professor Fried, it stems from the purported
illegality of nuclear weapons. However, if adopted, it would make the
threats and counter-threats involved in the arms control equilibrium un-
certain. It would not lead to reducing accidental or negligent launches,
because those by their nature are unintentional. The pledge itself is un-
verifiable as are all undertakings not to use or be the first to use weapons
or engage in attacks and for this reason would be unacceptable as an arms
control measure. Breach of such understandings occurs when the aggres-
sor or belligerent acts, and by then, the controls have lost their
effectiveness.
Hence, Professor Fried concludes:
[I]f the pledge were broken or rescinded, the legal and factual situa-
tion would be the same as if no pledge has been made . . . [but] a
mutual no first-use pledge can, as much as humanly possible, guaran-
25. The relationship of strategy, defense and security in terms of the perspectives of
the "statesman," is examined in EARLE, MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY 117-118 (1982).
"More than three hundred years ago, Francis Bacon pointed out that the ability of a nation
to defend itself depended upon its material possessions than upon the spirit of the people,
less upon its stocks of gold than upon the iron of determination of the body politic." Id. at
124
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tee the prevention of the ultimate blasphemy - an unintended end of
civilization.26
Professor Fried's proposals simply do not reach to the decision pro-
cess shared by the United States and the Soviet Union. They fail to weigh
the interdependence of decisions and fail to lead to the strategy they
share about arms control and the arms control deterrence equilibrium.
Such proposals, however, upset that strategy and leave both sides open to
conventional warfare or, more likely, lead to one side securing strategic
nuclear advantage through clandestine activities.
Arms control processes unquestionably fall short of producing a sta-
ble strategic situation, largely because they are dependant upon the rela-
tions between two sides. Those relations may even be adversely affected
by pledges or declarations of unverifiable professions of no-first-use or
even of moratoria on a unilateral basis.27 Both sides have shown in their
practice that they are willing to communicate, even if tenuously, about
maintaining the strategic weapons stand-off. We cannot proceed to better
ordering processes among them if we deny this minimal level of commu-
nications, or the practice that it establishes.
III. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)
The reasons for proposing the Strategic Defense Initiative and the
actions to be taken under the initiative at times become confusing.2" Pres-
ident Reagan has stressed that SDI is a research and technology program
and Congress has provided funding and authorization exclusively for
those purposes. 29 Both the executive and legislative branches are, to that
extent, committed to determining whether the strategies for attaining or
maintaining deterrence are sufficient, and whether they can be improved
upon by new strategies, including the deployment of defensive weaponry.
One of the important reasons for pursuing SDI is to seek the means to
strengthen a deterrence equilibrium that is in danger of breaking down.
The strategic perspective is that of the security of the United States and
its allies in a global order and the security sought, is that which will as-
sure that nuclear war will not break out.
SDI and the retention of the right of first use share in common a
strategy of deterrence that has been adopted by the United States. That
26. Fried, supra note 1, at 115.
27. For example, verification of activities in outer space - particularly of anti-satellite
activities - has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the United States according to Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth Adelman in his statement before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Outer Space, May 18, 1983 quoted in DOCUMENTS
ON DISARMAMENT, WASHINGTON ACDA PuB. 125, released Feb. 1986, USGPO, 420-430 (1986)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTS].
28. See President Reagan's speech of March 23, 1983 announcing SDI, quoted in Docu-
MENTS at 199-201.
29. President Reagan's National Security Decision Directive on Defense Against Strate-
gic Weapons (Mar. 25, 1983), quoted in DOCUMENTS at 206, 207.
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strategy depends upon several assumptions, the foremost of which is that
the use of the strategic nuclear weapons would cause intolerable destruc-
tion. It is assumed that our rivals are influenced by a credible threat that
any such attack upon us would be the subject of a comparable re-
sponse-a response in kind or otherwise-causing the same destructive
force or greater. But a credible threat presupposes the
capabilites-reliable, tested, and mobilized for response. The strike that
causes severe destruction to us need not be limited to the nuclear threat,
but may be caused by a massive attack with the modern conventional
weapons. The no first use pledge would destroy this strategy-both its
deterrence and the credibility of its deterrence, and leave us bare to the
possibility of facing situations that are not subject to deterrence. More-
over, the illegality of nuclear weapons or the no first use form of illegality
would lead to serious consequences in terms of our governmental
processes relating to defense preparedness.
Professor Fried has attacked SDI for a number of reasons, familiar to
the public debate, but mounted by the groups antagonistic to SDI. These
attacks tend to miss the fundamental points. If SDI identifies an effective
defense system, that system must be one that is cost-effective. It must be
invulnerable to the kind of destruction during, or at the initiation of, war-
fare or aggression which would make it inoperable. It must contribute to
arms control objectives of deterrence. Fried has already resolved the
question of its feasibility, though, because he sides with those who find it
technologically infeasible. Fried has posited his own strategy of an effec-
tive or strategic defense and his conception of SDI is exclusively a com-
prehensive defense against any attack, by any weapon, at any time. Stra-
tegic defense is not limited to illusions or utopian claims, but extends to
measures that will enhance deterrence.
3 0
Professor Fried is troubled by the impact SDI will have on the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty),3 ' but that treaty was designed for
the strategic nuclear weapons equilibrium, for example, making all targets
except either the capital city or land based strategic weapons hostage to a
nuclear attack. This perspective would thus embrace Fried's "illegal"
weapons for the balancing process, but necessarily embroils him in the
inconsistencies of his argument.
More importantly, the ABM Treaty is a strategy in itself, and not
sacrosanct. It is a desirable strategy only if it promises to achieve the
objectives wanted from arms control. If those objectives cannot be
achieved, then the challenge is to establish either more realistic objec-
tives, or to change the overall strategy.32 SDI provides us with an oppor-
30. See WHITE HOUSE PAMPHLET, THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, PR
40-2: St 8/985 (1985).
31. ABM Treaty, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No.
7503.
32. The Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (Apr. 6, 1983), pub-
lished in DOCUMENTS at 272 [hereinafter Snowcroft Report].
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tunity to conduct this appraisal with empirical rather than speculative
data.
Moreover, the realities of practice with the Soviet Union relating to
arms control under the current system, must be closely and continuously
assessed."3 The assessments of the United States government indicate
that the Soviet Union has been vigorously pursuing its own SDI program
and has been doing so for a number of years. The Soviet Union has also
been strengthening its defense programs and defense deployments in gen-
eral, weakening the thrusts of the ABM system. The Soviet funding for
these-defense efforts has been substantial and an effective defense strat-
egy coupled with Soviet offensive arms provides the possibility of a major
strategic breakthrough. As the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) has indicated:
The Soviets have devoted about as much financially to defenses of all
kinds, including ABM, as they have to their strategic offensive forces.
The prospect of the Soviet Union deploying an effective, nationwide
defensive system along with extensive air defenses would raise a seri-
ous challenge to deterrence and stability in the absence of an effective
defense response by the West. 4
In short, the United States, under the checks and balances process of
arms control, must respond to the actions of the Soviet Union if deter-
rence equilibria is to be maintained. The United States has not protested
the Soviet research efforts simply because they are permitted under
SALT and ABM Treaties, and are not readily reached through arms con-
trol agreements because, at the research or early development stage, there
is no way of monitoring or verifying what is taking place. 5 For the United
States, verification goes to the heart of the arms control process,36 so that
arms control cannot extend to that which cannot be verified.
ACDA publications observe that SDI falls within our arms control
perspectives, citing the President's speech to the United Nations in 1984:
In the near term, the SDI research program responds to the Soviet
ABM effort, which includes actual deployments. In the long term, SDI
research will be a crucial means by which the United States and the
Soviet Union can safely agree to very deep reductions, and eventually,
even the elimination of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads....
33. Id. at 275. The Snowcroft Report does not claim that arms control can prevent war,
only that it can reduce the risk of war. Moreover, arms control must be achieved through
agreements that control, and the primary objective is "stability" in the weapons equilib-
rium, and presumably in relations with the Soviet Union.
34. ACDA, FISCAL YEAR 1986 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT, at viii (Apr. 1985).
35. See PRESIDENTIAL REPORT, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE SPECIAL REP. No. 136, SOVIET NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS (1985).
36. In pursuing verification, we must apply rigor to ensure the appropriate use of terms
that are stipulated or defined, or the policy implications may be garbled. For a discussion on
this subject, see Marshall, Dour Thoughts on Inspection, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 24,
1962), cited in A. KATZ, VERIFICATION AND SALT 2 (1979).
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SDI programs are consistent with present U.S. positions in arms con-
trol talks. The President stated in his September 24, 1984 speech to
the United Nations General Assembly that the United States is com-
mitted to getting real results in the search for "ways to reduce the
vast stockpile of armaments in the world" and restated United States
willingness to discuss, among other topics, the relationship between
offensive and defensive forces.
37
United States' policy is not that proclaimed by those who attack the
SDI for whatever reasons they adduce. United States' policy is pro-
claimed by the President, and, through Congress, SDI has secured the
support of the people of the United States. In its 1984 Annual Report,
the ACDA makes this policy clear, stressing again the research objectives
of the SDI program. The full thrust of this policy comes from a statement
that cannot be misunderstood:
The fundamental objective of arms control, from the United States
perspective, is to reduce the risk of war, especially nuclear war, by
strengthening deterrence and by lowering levels of arms on an equita-
ble and verifiable basis thereby fostering a more stable East-West re-
lationship. Other goals include facilitating crisis management, reduc-
ing the destructiveness of war should it occur and lessening the cost of
military forces. But the key test is can arms control lessen the chances
of conflict, particularly any nuclear conflict, and thereby improve U.S.
security?38
Arms control under these perspectives is not part of the far reaching
policy and strategy of the democratic nations to establish global order
itself and make that order serve the security of the global community.39
Through arms control, we must attend to those matters that raise ques-
tions of the minimal security upon which we can proceed.4 0 As the ACDA
Report continues:
Past negotiations, as the President's Commission on Strategic Forces
pointed out in April 1983, have "produced neither agreement among
ourselves, restraint by the Soviets, nor lasting mutual limitations on
strategic offensive weapons." Moreover, new technologies may chal-
lenge longheld assumptions about deterrence, stability and the rela-
tionship between offensive and defensive forces. On both counts, a re-
assessment is needed of our arms control approaches to see how
progress might best be made.
President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), proposed in
37. See supra note 34, at viii.
38. 1984 ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY ANN. REP. 1.
39. Cf. address delivered by Secretary Shultz in San Francisco, October 14, 1985, re-
printed in ARMS CONTROL, STRATEGIC STABILITY, AND GLOBAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE
CURRENT POLICY No. 750.
40. It appears that even though the ABM Treaty is of definite duration and the strate-
gic offensive arms agreements are limited in duration, it is intended that the link between
retaliatory capabilities of offensive weapons and the ABM regime cannot be broken, or the
ABM Treaty would lose its rationale.
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March 1983, reflected that need. It called for a major research pro-
gram to determine the feasibility for shifting strategic nuclear strategy
toward more reliance on defensive forces, that is, integrating strategic
defense into strategic deterrence. This shift's ultimate goal would be
to move away from the doctrine of mutually assured destruction and
eventually eliminate the threat posed by nuclear-armed missiles.'
This framework of policy and policy goals stands sharply at variance
with Professor Fried's perspectives. In this framework, we have embodied
a search into controlling the emerging technologies, while recognizing that
the military and peacetime technologies are independent. The possibili-
ties of Soviet adventurism continuing as it has in the past must be in-
cluded; these may lead to a strategic imbalance outweighing the arms
control process. Deterrence limited to nuclear war is identified, but there
is implied the need to thrust our deterrence perspectives more deeply
into the full array of Soviet interactions with the democratic states of the
West.
CONCLUSION
Under current practice, states invoke a variety of strategic instru-
ments of policy to have their own way. They seek to influence each other,
acquire power, or deny power to their rivals. Military measures provide
the instrument that appears to afford effective results, even if limited to
backing up other policy instruments that are ideological, economic or dip-
lomatic in nature. Arms control processes do not restrain these activities
or reshape the competitive policies of states. They can, at best, serve us in
seeking a more effective global public order, and, if they do not work,
they warn us that we must depend more heavily upon capabilities that
assure deterrence through military capabilities and military readiness.
Arms control processes depend upon the establishment of an effec-
tive practice among states in which we can develop and rely upon their
shared expectations about the decisions they are making or intending to
make. Such a practice depends upon reliable, timely, continuing and com-
prehensive intercommunications. The processes to check aggression are
currently linked to improvement of these communications in order to
provide the assurance of a reliable practice of control, in a reliable, shared
enterprise.
Professor Fried falls back on rules and moral precepts that character-
ized the outlook on law of the 19th and early 20th centuries, but in to-
day's world in which decisions and policy are the sources upon which con-
trol must rest, the earlier perspectives can no longer serve us. Our present
policies relate to how the military capabilities can serve our maintaining
minimal security in a world where hostility can break out and escalate to
uncontrollable levels of violence and break out readily from the frame-
work of rules, as Fried himself has noted.
41. See supra note 38, at 1, 2.
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These larger perspectives are appropriately summarized by Profes-
sors McDougal, Reisman, and Willard:
The use of a strategic instrument [in the power process] must be un-
derstood broadly. We speak of the use of the military instrument, for
example, not only when bullets have been fired and forces are moved
in large numbers from their garrisons. Instruments of strategy, like
the whole of the process of effective power, operate on participants all
the time. The military instrument is used even when weapons remain
in the armory and troops in the garrison. As long as the availability of
troops and weapons are perceived by other participants and taken
into account in the formation of their own goals and their ongoing
behavior, the military instrument is being used. The same observation
applies to all other instruments of strategy; they are everpresent and
especially influential when other participants perceive their availabil-
ity and the predispositions of those having control over such instru-
ments to exploit them. Hence, much of the strategic use of bases in
the world effective power process involves prepositioning and commu-
nication rather than actual use. The rapid deployment of a long dis-
tance fleet to a critical area may be enough to deter participants
within or outside of that area from adventures they may have contem-
plated. The mere availability of a rapid deployment force which can
be expeditiously sent to any part of the planet may perform the same
function.42
In sum, the strategies among the major rivals in a global and compet-
itive power process are of contending public orders, of contentions that
involve strategies emanating from the social process itself, but manifested
most often in military strategies. Significantly, the element of threat, the
perceptions of power and of credible use, the assurance of the will to act,
and of firm commitment executed through action, are features of this
changing rivalry.
Clausewitz caught the political element that occurs when states re-
sort to war, but in today's strategic setting, the interdeterminancy of
combat and the perception of combat through credible power is apparent.
As to this, Clausewitz observed:
Combat is the only effective force in war; its aim is to destroy the
enemy's forces as a means to a further end. That holds good even if no
actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption
that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed. It follows
that the destruction of the enemy's force underlies all military actions;
all plans are ultimately based on it, resting like an arch on its abut-
ment. Consequently, all action is undertaken in the belief that if the
ultimate test of arms should actually occur, the outcome would be
favorable. The decision by arms is for all major and minor operations
in war what cash payment is in commerce. Regardless how complex
the relationship between the two parties, regardless how rarely settle-
42. M. McDoUGAL, W. REISMAN & A. WILLARD, The World Process of Effective Power:
The Global War System, in POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW 376 (1985).
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ments actually occur, they can never be entirely absent. (emphasis
added) .
3
In its foreign policy, the United States seeks from the Soviet Union
common objectives of global order; but to achieve the global order that is
acceptable to us, we shall be compelled over a long period of time to
shape Soviet policy toward the values that we prize. When these efforts
prove unavailing, we must take up the strategies of nations that are under
threat and attack, even if those threats are immersed in the peacetime
processes we identify with influence and power. Law, always policy-ori-
ented in this context of global competition, is shaped primarily to pre-
serve the limited security arrayed against the nature of the threat. To
expect more from our law or policy, or worse, to expect law or policy to
deny us the choices we must make to ensure our security, is fatuous.
An effective policy-oriented analysis of nuclear weapons, their use in
war-fighting, and their use as a component of a strategic instrument in
"peacetime" must clarify the goals of the policy-maker and provide him
with operable alternatives in facing threats to his policy or strategy - or to
his nation.4
Crises or future opportunities, whether they are "found" to occur or
induced, are the future "missions" for similar strategies that can couple
nuclear weapons threats, subversion, or various forms of coercion. In
these, too, we can anticipate that the nuclear weapons would be invoked
without any expectation, that they will be used, or perhaps as in the Cu-
ban Missile Crisis, under conditions in which an accommodation can be
reached in return for diminishing or dropping the threat. Our perspec-
tives about what constitutes a "threat" under such conditions as these
must be extended to the realities of nuclear and other weaponry; those
realities are affected by strategies using organized groups posing as "free-
dom fighters" involved in "wars of liberation," or using deployment and
other strategies and threats aimed at us or our allies.
We cannot sever the strategic aspects of law from the larger perspec-
tives of global order and the continuing imminence of threat. When law is
perceived as part of the global ordering among adversaries, it is then
readily identified with strategic goals. As in other relations, as the claims
and demands processes of states over their competitive policies, the stra-
tegic goals are competing goals. What the Soviet Union wants from the
43. K. v. CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 97 (M. Howard & P. Paret eds. and trans. 1976).
44. The Cuban Missile Crisis provides us with an ample illustration of a deployment
use of nuclear weapons during peacetime, and might be compared with the deployment of
the Soviet nuclear weapons targeted on NATO allies in Europe. The Soviet Union, a nation
then "inferior" to the United States in such weapons, and a great distance away, was able to
introduce these weapons, to preserve its grip on Cuba, and strengthen its relations with its
government, and to ensure through President Kennedy's message to Premier Khrushchev of
October 27, 1962 that we would "give assurances against an invasion of Cuba." excerpted in
THE ART AND PRACTICE OF MILITARY STRATEGY 224 (G.E. Thibault ed. 1984).
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global order is not what the democratic states are seeking and herein lie
the seeds of conflict.
4"
45. See Almond, The Struggle for a World Legal Order: An Overview of an Adversary
Process, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1977).
